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Framing Wrongs and Performing Rights in Northern Ireland: Towards a Butlerian 







Feminist strategising on abortion has been dominated by a “pro-choice” frame. 
Increasingly, however, pro-choice discourse is being viewed as inadequate to meet contemporary 
and complex feminist aims and analyses, in particular due to the individualising ontological 
framework upon which it appears to be based. The work of Judith Butler is one location where 
such concerns have been explored and an alternative approach based upon a renewed analysis of 
the concept of “life” has been asserted. Foregrounding the fundamental precariousness of 
intersubjective life and opening the socio-political conditions sustaining precarious life to 
democratic public engagement carries significant implications for feminist strategising for 
Butler, and envisages a reconceptualisation of debate on abortion. In this article Butler’s work on 
life will be combined with her theoretical tool of the frame to explore space which may exist 
within pro-choice strategising to potentially work towards such a renewed approach to life in 
social debate on abortion. This space may be used to rethink feminist strategising on abortion 
beyond pro-choice discourse, and presents an accessible starting point from which to do so. In 
carrying out this analysis insights will be drawn from feminist advocacy and activism in the 
contingent location of Northern Ireland where recent employment of a health frame and a rights 
frame demonstrate instances of pro-choice strategising which may be reiterated to shift feminist 
activism towards more radical engagement with life as a precarious social process demanding 
critical attention. 
 




Abortion is an issue that engages diverse feminist strategising in a myriad of 
contemporary global locations. Within this strategising, “pro-choice” approaches towards 
achieving enhanced and dignified access to abortion facilities have been dominant. Within 
feminist theorising, however, sustained attempts have been made from a variety of perspectives 
to voice alternatives to the liberal, individualistic commitments of pro-choice discourse. Judith 
Butler is one such voice. For Butler, a renewed approach to the concept of “life” carries 
significant implications for feminist strategising and envisages a reconceptualisation of debate on 
abortion. Butler seeks to foreground the precariousness of intersubjective life, open such 
conditions of precariousness to democratic public engagement, and so engender a reflexive 
approach to society’s obligations to life and subjects’ ability to live a socially viable life. In this 
essay, Butler’s work will be employed to explore space which may exist within pro-choice 
strategising to potentially work towards such a renewed approach to life. This space may be used 
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to rethink feminist strategising on abortion beyond pro-choice discourse, and presents an 
accessible starting point from which to do so. 
In undergoing this exploration, insights will be gathered from engagement with 
contemporary pro-choice strategising in Northern Ireland where restrictive access to abortion 
stands as an anomaly in UK law. Pro-choice advocacy in this location constitutes an historically 
contingent example of sustained but also shifting strategising which contains much potential to 
move towards a rethinking of life. Analysis of this potential will be assisted via the use of 
Butler’s concept of the “frame”, the discursive shaping of what can and cannot be seen, heard 
and known. Two recent pro-choice approaches to the strategic framing of abortion in Northern 
Ireland will be engaged with; the health frame and the rights frame. The latter of these two 
frames in particular has been employed through a submission of evidence to the inquiry 
procedure of the Optional Protocol for the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), allowing for analysis of rights claiming as a 
performative practice under the auspices of the rights frame. In working towards the rethinking 
of life in more radical ways it will be asserted that recent invocation of the health frame holds the 
potential to illuminate the ethical obligations of intersubjective life through acts of public 
mourning, and that rights claiming offers possibility for interrupting the current hegemonies of 
gendered life through performatively intervening in the social processes by which gender identity 
is articulated. 
This investigation will be undertaken by, firstly, situating the study through providing a 
brief genealogy of abortion provision in Northern Ireland which strategising has been directed 
towards. This will be followed by an introduction to Butler’s theoretical framework on life, 
recognition and practices of framing. Thirdly, discussion will move to investigate two dominant 
strategies employed in pro-choice campaigning on abortion in Northern Ireland as frames, 
considering the space which exists in each for moving towards a new approach to life. Finally, 
some precarious conclusions will be drawn as to feminist strategising moving towards a 
radicalisation of the abortion debate. 
 
 
Genealogy of Abortion Provision in Northern Ireland 
In considering contemporary developments in abortion strategising in Northern Ireland, it 
is important to note that the geopolitical history of the UK and Ireland has endowed Northern 
Ireland with particular legal arrangements in this area. Prior to 1920 all of Ireland was governed 
directly from London as part of the UK. Following political contention seeking Irish 
independence, however, the 1920 Government of Ireland Act sought to establish a devolved 
government in Dublin to administer the majority of the island, and one in Belfast which would 
be responsible for six counties in the north east, to become known as Northern Ireland. In 1922 
the part of the island to be governed from Dublin seceded from the UK and declared itself the 
Irish Free State, later becoming the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland did not join the Free 
State, remaining part of the UK, as it continues to do under devolved administration. Northern 
Ireland is usually included in the jurisdiction of UK legislation created at Westminster, although 
on some matters, including abortion, differing provision exists. 
Abortion is currently illegal in Northern Ireland aside from two exceptions. Firstly, 
termination carried out after the 28
th
 week of pregnancy is considered legal if the act was carried 
out in good faith for the purposes of preserving the mother’s life2 and, secondly, termination 
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carried out in good faith prior to the 28
th
 week will be legal if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that continuing the pregnancy would render the woman a “physical and mental wreck”.3 
However, doctors in Northern Ireland have traditionally expressed an unwillingness to test this 
piecemeal framework, especially up to 28 weeks, for fear that judicial interpretation of “good 
faith” will go against them (Northern Ireland Family Planning Association, Northern Ireland 
Women’s European Platform and Alliance for Choice paras. 4.52, 4.69). Legal uncertainty on 
abortion in the earlier stages of pregnancy was significantly reduced in England, Scotland and 
Wales with the passing of the Abortion Act 1967 which permits legal termination in four broad 
circumstances; cases of risk to the woman's life; to prevent serious permanent injury to the 
woman's physical or mental health; to avoid risk of injury to the physical or mental health of any 
existing child(ren); and cases likely to result in severe foetal abnormality. This represents a 
significant departure from the criminalising approach in Northern Ireland. It also has the 
practical consequence of rendering abortion provision widely accessible, in contrast to the legal 
framework for Northern Ireland which permits only 40 women on average per year to access 
legal termination (Northern Ireland Executive, 2012). In light of the significant changes 
engendered by the 1967 Act in the rest of the UK, it must be asked why Northern Ireland was 
excluded from such reform. 
When the 1960’s debates were taking place in Westminster, Northern Ireland was the 
only region of the UK operating under a devolved Parliament and so the issue was left for the 
Northern Ireland Parliament to debate itself. However, such debate never took place. This 
omission can be attributed to the particular religious and social conservatism of Northern Ireland, 
and its heavy representation in Northern Irish politics (Roulston, 1989:221). Government 
documentation from the time reveals that the likelihood of conscientious objection from medical 
staff was advanced as the major reason for prohibiting wider access to legal termination, but that 
this assertion was also used as an excuse for political inertia (The Newsletter, 2 January 2013). 
When direct rule returned to Westminster following collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament 
in 1972, the question of creating parity of esteem in abortion provision rarely came close to 
materialising into legislative action. This was in the most part due to the continuing lack of 
impetus from Northern Irish political representatives. In terms of local grassroots lobbying for 
reform, following the increase in sectarian conflict from the beginning of the 1970’s until the late 
1990’s the energies of the women’s movement in Northern Ireland were often directed 
elsewhere,
4
 and divergences of opinion on the issue of abortion also confounded collective 
campaigning from the women’s sector (Sales, 1997:133-134). Since the early 2000’s and the 
stabilisation of devolved government, however, public debate has increased on the issue and a 
number of strategies have been applied by self-defined “pro-choice” and “pro-life” groups to 
solidify the law either way. These oppositional factions have clashed in political chambers, court 
rooms and on the streets (see Fletcher, 2005; Smyth, 2006). As in other global locations, one 
interlinking factor in all strategic approaches employed in activism on abortion in Northern 
Ireland has been engagement in some form with the socio-cultural recognition of life. Recent 
pro-choice advocacy in particular has engaged with the question of life and its recognition in 
particularly interesting, and potentially productive, ways. In order to examine these assertions 
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further, some brief comments on the theory of recognition and the socio-political condition of 
“life”, as theorised by Judith Butler, must be engaged with. 
 
 
Theorising Strategy: Recognition of Life, Livability and the Frame 
When recognition is used in this sense it is referring to the conditions afforded by 
localised social environments which allow us to engage with others to affirm one another’s 
existence, and, in doing so, maintain self-affirmation. The theory of recognition decentres the 
modern conception of the individualistic and atomistic subject by stressing the ethical 
intersubjective nature and dependency of life (Williams, 1997:2). Recognition is part of the 
ongoing construction of the self, operating to produce a subject through externality; all subjects 
need the “Other –individuals, state, community–and the corresponding ‘social dimension of 
normativity that governs the scene of recognition’ to exist (Butler, 2005:23). Recognition of life 
is thus inextricably linked to the formation of the self as a socially viable being, encouraging 
intersubjective respect and the creation of individual identity (Douzinas and Gearey, 2005:197; 
Douzinas, 2000:263-296). Lack of recognition, or misrecognition, not only demeans and 
degrades conceptions of the self as an individual, or as part of a wider group, but also projects 
discursive messages about these selves and groups, placing certain lives in an inferior position 
which leaves them vulnerable to oppression and maltreatment (Douzinas and Gearey, 2005:197). 
Intersubjective recognition has emerged as a consistent theme in the work of Butler. Kaye 
Mitchell elaborates that Butler’s approach to recognition precedes from Spinoza’s idea that 
‘every human being seeks to persist in his [sic] own being’ to Hegel’s claim ‘that desire is 
always a desire for recognition’, combining these assertions in her own suggestion that ‘to persist 
in one’s own being is only possible on the condition that we are engaged in receiving and 
offering recognition’ (Mitchell, 2008:424 citing Butler, 2004a:31). Recognition for Butler 
produces the subject in relationship with social and cultural conditions, so the “I” ‘has no story 
of its own that is not at once a story of a relation – or a set of relations to – a set of norms’ 
(Butler, 2005:12). 
The offering and receiving of recognition in Butler’s work is closely linked to the critical 
investigation of human life and what she has come to outline the possibilities for “livable” life; 
socio-political processes of recognition shape who is recognised and recognisable as a subject 
capable of living a life that counts (Butler, 2009a:5). Livability, therefore, can be understood as 
the ability to sustain a socially viable life in our existence as interdependent beings. Butler 
outlines that there are at least two senses of living; a minimum biological form, and another that 
establishes the minimum conditions for living a livable life with reference to culturally 
intelligible ideas of “human” life (Butler, 2004a:39). All human life is exposed and dependent on 
the other and conditions outside itself, haunted by the possibility of failing to be recognised, 
always vulnerable to injury, destruction and a lack of livability, requiring various social and 
economic conditions to be met in order to be sustained (Butler, 2009a:14). This vulnerability is 
what Butler terms the “precariousness” of life and forms the ontological framework which Butler 
asserts should guide all social and political action and engagement. In encouraging social 
engagement with the inevitable precariousness of life it must be acknowledged that ‘there is no 
life without the conditions of life that variably sustain life, and those conditions are pervasively 
social, establishing not the discrete ontology of the person, but rather the interdependency of 
persons’ (Butler, 2009a:19). States of precariousness are distributed differently, and politically, 
throughout society and this inescapable condition of precariousness means that we must abandon 
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the protectionism of “life itself”, the precariousness of all life making this an impossible task 
(Butler, 2009a:18). This acknowledgement of life as precarious and interdependent must move 
society towards securing the conditions for livable life on egalitarian grounds; realising positive 
social obligations to provide the basic supports that minimise precariousness and maximise 
livability (Butler, 2009a:21-22). 
Such an analysis leads Butler to outline a new approach to abortion as a social issue, and 
one which departs from traditional pro-choice discourse of individualistic choice. Butler uses the 
ontological approach above to assert that ‘perhaps there is a way to retrieve thinking about life 
for the left and to make use of this framework of precarious life to sustain a strong feminist 
position on reproductive freedoms’ (Butler, 2009a:15-16). Following this, the considerations 
guiding debate on abortion should not be “life itself”, but should always be the interdependent 
conditions of life, where “life” is something that requires these conditions in order to become 
livable (Butler, 2009a:23). Therefore, Butler asserts that ‘the point is emphatically not to extend 
the "right to life’ to any and all people who want to make this claim on behalf of mute embryos, 
but rather to understand how the ‘viability’ of a woman’s life depends upon an exercise of bodily 
autonomy and on social conditions that enable that autonomy’ (Butler, 2004a:12). While 
corporeal autonomy remains part of Butler’s envisaged approach, the central focus is shifted to 
livability and the asking of questions about which lives are recognisable as valued reproductively 
and what type of vulnerability current organisation of reproductive relations permit us to see and 
hear (Butler, 2004b:21). 
In moving towards such a renewed approach to “life”, Butler’s work also suggests a rethinking 
of “pro-choice” and “pro-life” binarisation and how this qualifies what will and will not count as 
meaningful political discourse (Butler, 2004a:107). In ‘Is Kinship Always Already 
Heterosexual?’ Butler outlines the need to critically reflect on why the parameters of political 
debate on gay marriage have been fixed where they currently stand – “for” and “against” – and 
how this has come to restrict political engagement (Butler, 2004a:107). These comments may 
quite easily also be applied to the abortion debate. Butler sets out to question why under present 
conditions “becoming political” depends on the ability to operate within currently existing 
binaries (Butler, 2004a:107). What is needed is attention to the foreclosure of the possible that 
takes place in the framing of political debate and a different conception of politics that attends to 
its own foreclosures (Butler, 2004a:108). In order to work towards such a rethinking of the 
abortion debate using a radicalised approach to “life” as not the internal feature of a monadic 
individual, but a conditioned process socio-political process (Butler, 2009a:23), it is submitted 
that analysis must start by investigating the current possibilities that exist within feminist 
strategising in favour of reproductive freedoms. While rejecting the liberal foundations of pro-
choice discourse, it is possible that elements of such strategising may be capitalised upon in 
order to work towards a renewal of the abortion debate. In seeking to undertake such analysis 
Butler’s theorising on frames and framing provides an additionally useful tool. 
The frame fits into Butler’s theory as a means of deploying socio-cultural recognition of 
life. While the concept is not unique to Butler, Butler’s particular exploration of framing in the 
context of her wider work offers some unique insights which are particularly salient for the 
current analysis. Butler considers the “frame” as a discursive means of interpretation which is 
applied to an idea, situation or event, having the effect of controlling and delimiting its 
surrounding discourse – what can be seen, heard and felt – thereby working to establish the 
parameters of reality itself (Butler, 2009a:xi). The frame acts as an interpretive lens, filtering 
what can be understood, and the meanings which can be gathered from this understanding. 
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Frames operate everyday from the micro level of social relations to the macro level of global 
political relations, all aiding the presentation of partial accounts of social phenomena. No frame 
can ever be fully inclusive but always forecloses something in an attempt to control and stabilise 
what is represented inside itself (Butler, 2009a:xiii). In interacting with processes of recognition, 
frames aid in the differential distribution of the precariousness of human life, those who are 
framed as unrecognisable are characterised by precariousness (Butler, 2009b:xii-xiii). 
Butler’s discussion of the operation of the frame resonates particularly with strategising 
on abortion and its relation to processes of recognition. Zero sum games of recognition have 
often played out in framing of the debate, pitting the life of the foetus against the woman and 
eschewing wider approaches to life as an intersubjective, socio-political process. Such framing is 
significant as it not only affects our intellectual understanding of the lives involved, but our 
moral responses to them and the suffering they are perceived to undergo (Butler, 2009a:41). 
Butler elaborates that ‘whether and how we respond to the suffering of others, how we formulate 
moral criticisms, how we articulate political analyses, depends upon a certain field of perceptible 
reality having already been established’ (Butler, 2009a:64). In contemporary feminist framing, 
therefore, it is important to analyse the approach to life which is being taken and ask whether any 
space exists to stimulate societal debate on the politics of life and livability. Indeed, for Butler, 
frames are iterable structures, requiring repetition to maintain coherence and authority. The 
iterability of the frame leads Butler to assert that it is not the assertion of new frames that radical 
politics should work towards, but the reiteration of currently existing ones, the reworking of what 
is already there in new directions (Butler, 2009a:12). Keeping these comments in mind, attention 
will now turn to contemporary developments in framing the abortion debate by pro-choice 
advocates in Northern Ireland considering possibilities for reiteration of feminist strategising in a 
way that would stimulate re-engagement with the concept of “life” within the abortion debate. 
 
 
Strategic Approaches and Frames of Understanding 
a. The Health Frame 
The first frame employed by pro-choice strategising in Northern Ireland which can be analysed 
using Butler’s framework on recognition, life and livability can be described as the health frame. 
Increasingly pro-choice advocacy in a variety of global locations, including the Republic of 
Ireland, has turned to the language of health to frame their concerns about the wrongs of 
restrictive abortion access (see McBride Stetson, 2001; Smyth, 2005:125). The major benefit of 
such a frame for pro-choice strategising is that it offers potential to counter the moralistic 
framing of abortion which often seeks to foreclose debate on women’s health and wellbeing. The 
work of Fegan and Rebouche (2003:233) has elaborated how, in the Northern Ireland context, 
the health frame has emerged as the safest option for pro-choice lobbyists and advocates. Indeed, 
the employment of health as a means of attempting to reframe the debate in the province 
occurred as early as the 1990’s when the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition sought to relocate 
political discussion of abortion within the parameters of health (Fegan and Rebouche, 2003:232). 
The health frame also very much directed the decade-long judicial review litigation in which the 
Family Planning Association Northern Ireland sought to achieve guidelines on the legal 
parameters of abortion access for women and clinicians from the Department of Health Social 
Services and Public Safety (See Fletcher, 2005). 
The health frame has been most recently employed by Northern Irish pro-choice 
advocates following the highly publicised death of Savita Halappanavar in November 2012 after 
101 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 4  December 2013 
being denied a life-saving termination 17 weeks into her pregnancy at a Galway hospital. 
Admitted to hospital experiencing a miscarriage Savita Halappanavar was told that her 
pregnancy was no longer viable, but that she could not be provided with a legal abortion. She 
died four days later from sceptic shock and E coli (BBC News 13 April 2013). The death of a 
woman due to a lack of clarity on when abortion provision is legal highlighted for pro-choice 
activists the threat to life that restrictive abortion provision generates on both sides of the Irish 
border (BBC News 16 November 2012). However, events surrounding the death of Savita did 
more than draw attention to concerns of physical life alone; the framing of the wrongs involved 
in this case can be seen to potentially create space for deeper engagement with “life” in the 
Butlerian sense. This potential was revealed in the public performance of vigils which took place 
across Ireland, including in Belfast, in the days and weeks following Savita’s death. These public 
acts of mourning worked towards a kind of social undoing which foregrounded life’s 
precariousness and societal obligations to it. As Butler states, ‘open grieving is bound up with 
outrage, and outrage in the face of injustice… has enormous political potential’ (Butler, 
2009a:39). 
Butler directly engages with the question of mourning in a number of locations in her 
work. In her early work she outlines that the heterosexual subject’s melancholia lies in the 
foreclosed mourning of homosexual desire so that all identity is troubled at its origin, shadowed 
by an incompleteness that can never be fully acknowledged (Butler, 2006:86-89). In Precarious 
Life Butler develops this analysis of mourning and foreclosure further to consider public 
prohibition of mourning in cultural contexts such as the AIDS epidemic and the “War on Terror” 
post-9/11 (see McIvor, 2012:416). Mourning becomes less an individual pathology, although the 
melancholic subject remains, and more a political and cultural phenomenon where some losses 
are cast as unspeakable by current regimes of recognition. As Butler outlines, ‘where there is no 
public recognition or discourse through which such a loss might be named and mourned, then 
melancholia takes on cultural dimensions’ (Butler, 1997:139). In such contexts Butler (2004a:23) 
advances making grief itself a resource for politics. 
A third sense of mourning, however, can be detected for Butler, and it is this third sense 
which reveals the potential in the most recent use of the health frame in Northern Irish pro-
choice strategy. Butler extends her analysis of public mourning to consider the ways in which 
acknowledging and mourning loss publically can have a dispossessing effect, revealing that I 
depend and am impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others, and can culture ethical 
attitudes of generosity and humility towards the other whom life depends upon (Butler, 
2009a:14). Acknowledging the loss of another due to the inevitable precariousness which faces 
all life turns Butler from considering situations of prohibited mourning alone to emphasising the 
ethical dispositions which may be cultivated through such practices of acknowledgement. This 
splits the work of mourning so that ‘it operates as an effective means of mobilising rage against 
the material and discursive powers that be while simultaneously involving an ethical 
responsiveness to the other and to ‘precarious life’’ (McIvor, 2012:415). In this shift in Butler’s 
work, recognition of loss gains the goal of creating an ethical response to loss, suffering and 
universal precariousness which could shape a less violent society. Acknowledging the nature of 
interdependent “life” allows us to understand that we are dispossessed by the other, by the 
other’s precariousness, leading us to realise our ethical obligations in social life. 
Experiences of dispossessing mourning are therefore fundamentally linked to the 
revitalised approach to life which Butler outlines. Acknowledging the precariousness of all life 
and engaging in debate as to the egalitarian obligations we collectively owe to life makes 
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subjects responsive to the losses and mourning of others. Importantly, once these losses and this 
mourning have been acknowledged the task is not merely to resolve them as quickly as possible, 
but to consider them. Butler insists upon ‘not resolving grief and staunching vulnerability too 
soon… but to take the very unbearability of exposure as the sign… of a common vulnerability’ 
(Butler, 2005:100). Thus, Butler asks ‘if we stay with the sense of loss, are we left feeling only 
passive and powerless, as some might fear? Or are we, rather, returned to a sense of human 
vulnerability, to our collective responsibility for the physical lives of one another’ (Butler, 
2004b:30). As David McIvor (2012:420) elaborates on this point, ‘incessant mourning keeps 
open our relations to others, provides a constant reminder of our constitutive sociality, and 
undergirds a more generous and humble approach to shared lives together’. 
From identifying with the other and the other’s suffering, Butler sees mourning as allied 
with a critical reflexivity about the ways in which certain lives figure as more valuable, more 
human than others. Grief and mourning for Butler are experiences that are ‘symptomatic of the 
inter-corporeal nature of existence: the extent to which one’s sense of self depends on others’ 
(Lloyd, 2007a:141). They act as forms of dispossession which engender a kind of undoing of one 
by another so that ‘my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical 
connection with others’ (Butler, 2004b:46). The discomfort and difficult demands made upon us 
by the questions of life facilitated by public mourning and the health frame in late 2012 in 
Northern Ireland, therefore, holds the potential for an opening towards concerns of vulnerability, 
recognition, interdependency and community. It exposes the precariousness of life and this 
precariousness as the moment when ethical relations are foregrounded and one is undone by 
unavoidable dependency on the other. 
In Northern Ireland, public mourning in the context of the death of Savita can be observed to 
have worked towards a dispossessing opening of the debate on gender, life and abortion, if only 
incrementally. It made discussion and recognition of the gendered vulnerability of life public and 
imperative, and provided space for those who are “pro-life” in the wide sense to engage. Definite 
shifts can also be detected in media reporting and in general attention to the issue of abortion in 
Northern Ireland. Perhaps such a re-consideration of the health frame and its underlying 
possibilities to engender cultures of dispossessing mourning does have potential in working 
towards a new debate on life and livability and perhaps such potential has come at a significant 
time. It is possible that cultures of social dispossession could underlie and interact with the 
effects of another recent strategic approach of the pro-choice movement in the Northern Ireland 
context – use of the rights frame and in particular the claiming of human rights. 
 
b. The Rights Frame: From Framing to Claiming 
Viewing the issue of abortion through the frame of human rights is also an approach which 
has proliferated pro-choice strategising in recent years. A significant factor in moves towards 
such framing has been the increasing dominance and authority of international human rights 
discourse, and the effect such discourse has had in securing changes to domestic laws (Cook et 
al., 2003:155, 215). As a result, human rights have come to be regarded as constituting a “rich, 
infinitely mouldable raw materials out of which individuals, communities and societies can 
shape their reproductive and sexual identity” (Cook et al., 2003:215). However, Butler reminds 
us that human rights, and the “human” they pertain to, are fundamentally caught up with norms 
of recognition and power differentials (Butler, 2004a:2, 17-39). Butler also outlines the “human” 
of human rights as necessarily contingent and not fully inclusive of the range of currently 
unintelligible and unrecognised ways of being and living (Butler, 2004a:36-38). As a result, 
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localised employment of rights framing must not be accepted uncritically, and must be 
contextually examined in terms of the engagement of such framing in local processes of 
recognition, life and livability. 
In Northern Ireland, pro-choice strategy has sought to engage with the framing of abortion as 
an issue of rights on a number of occasions. To date, paramount amongst these has been 
engagement with the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights debate which took place between 1998 and 
2008. Ultimately this process did not achieve recognition of abortion as an issue relevant for 
inclusion in a potential Bill. Despite this lack of success in using rights framing to expand the 
localised “human” to take into consideration the gendered experience of abortion, pro-choice 
strategising has turned to the frame of rights once again. By 2009, pro-choice strategy was in a 
position whereby a radical shift to overcome the mainstream morality-based framing dominating 
the local abortion debate was required. Utilising the language and symbolic signification of 
rights alone appeared insufficient to successfully challenge prevailing cultures of recognition; a 
more radical move was required. This radical move came with engagement in the practice of 
rights claiming. 
In December 2010 the Family Planning Association Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland 
Women’s European Platform and grassroots organisation Alliance for Choice, submitted 
evidence to the CEDAW Optional Protocol inquiry procedure. This procedure grants the 
Committee power to initiate inquiries into “grave or systematic” violations of rights under the 
1979 Convention. It provides an international platform for the scrutiny of domestic human rights 
violations and the making of recommendations by the Committee which are politically 
significant, although not legally binding. To date, only one inquiry has been made into the 
abduction, rape and murder of women in and around Ciudad Juárez, State of Chihuahua in 
Mexico (See CEDAW). 
The Northern Ireland submission was made on the basis that current legal provision on 
abortion violates provisions of CEDAW regarding policy measures to address discrimination; 
sex role stereotyping and prejudice; education; health; rural women; and marriage and family 
life. The submission focused upon the UK Government’s persistent failure to act upon this 
situation, emphasising that primary responsibility for implementing the rights contained in 
CEDAW lies with central Government at Westminster, and that devolution could no longer be 
used to ‘excuse the significant differences in the rights and equality of women within the UK’ 
(Northern Ireland Family Planning Association, Northern Ireland Women’s European Platform 
and Alliance for Choice paragraphs 3.1-3.2). The submission sought to petition the CEDAW 
Committee to instigate an inquiry into the situation and to recommend that a new legal 
framework be put in place that is non-discriminatory to women, does not criminalise and permits 
termination in cases of rape, incest and foetal abnormality. As such, the submission moved the 
pro-choice rights frame to actively claim rights. Given Butler’s view of human rights as 
implicated in norms of recognition and current discourses of intelligibility, asserting a claim to 
rights where they currently do not exist could effect a potentially significant shift in recognition 
of life. 
Claiming rights has indeed come to be viewed as a practice of demanding social 
recognition by seeking to arrest the flight of the floating signifier of the “human” and attach it to 
previously excluded identities and experiences (Douzinas and Gearey, 2005:191). This claiming 
as a struggle for recognition can be understood as both symbolic and material; challenging the 
language and the remit of rights in relation to certain lives, but also being ontologically 
consequential in potentially altering processes of subjection themselves (Douzinas, 2000:258). 
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Therefore, rights claiming is not just an empty language claim, but can actively help to begin 
realisation of the results it seeks to achieve. It is this nature of rights claiming which deems it a 
performative exercise with potential to challenge the cultural norms regulating life and livability. 
In what follows below, Butler’s work on performativity, and its development by Karen Zivi, will 
be utilised to consider how the CEDAW submission shift in pro-choice strategising can be 
understood as performatively empowering and sustaining a demand for the recognition of life 
and more inclusive livability, gendered livability in particular. 
 
 
Performing Rights, (Re)Performing Gender 
Judith Butler is perhaps most widely known for her theory of gender performativity 
formed in her early work. This theory suggests that subjects are, from the very beginning, 
produced by systems of discursive and normative power; subjected to them, formed, defined and 
reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures (Butler, 2006:2). Butler 
employs this view of subject formation to look specifically at cultural hegemonies which provide 
and maintain dominant scripts of gender. She suggests that any subject’s social intelligibility and 
viability is premised upon ongoing repetition of culturally acceptable gender norms under 
conditions of duress; punitive social, and often material, consequences exist if subjects do not 
repeat the performance of gender as expected. These repeated performances constitute the 
identity that they purport to be, so that ‘gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject 
who might be said to pre-exist the deed’ (Butler, 2006:34). Accordingly, gender is not a noun or 
a static cultural marker, but an incessant and repeated action (Butler, 2006:151). 
While Butler does see subjects as compelled to repeat gender to maintain social 
intelligibility, the performative repetition of gender scripts is not completely fixed. Opportunities 
exist to disrupt these performances and create space for subversive performances by acting upon 
the instability of current significations, generated by their need for constant repetition. Repeating 
norms differently works to produce alternative domains of intelligibility and resignification. This 
resignification is possible not by virtue of an autonomous, voluntaristic subject, but through the 
creative possibilities offered by the dual nature of power which Butler derives from Foucault 
(Foucault, 1990:82-96). This view sees power as both subjecting individuals, and thereby 
bringing intelligibly gendered subjects into existence, but also offering creative possibilities as 
subjects may ‘take an oppositional relation to power that is, admittedly, implicated in the very 
power one opposes’ (Butler, 2004b:17). 
It is possible that the practice of rights claiming can aid this resignification of 
performative gender by publically advocating subversive repetitions of what is understood to be 
“woman” or female life. It is at this point that performativity and performative subversions 
interact with cultures of livable and intelligible life. Such subversive repetitions made through 
the process of claiming rights can be viewed as performative contradictions (Butler, 2004a:191) 
which may rework and unsettle passionate attachments to gender subjection and so open up 
space for subversive performances of gender in social life more generally. It is through this 
newly created space for subversive performativity that unrecognised lives may lay claim to what 
they require. This possibility for rights claiming to engage with processes of gender 
performativity and the resignification of gendered life draws upon the performative nature of 
rights themselves, which has been elaborated by Karen Zivi. Zivi (2009) outlines that rights are 
traditionally understood to be “things”; in making a rights claim it is perceived that the claimant 
is describing something already in existence. However, the act of claiming a right is much more 
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than this, something is actively being performed and produced in making the claim (Zivi, 
2009:165). When those who are already culturally recognised as possessing rights make rights 
claims they performatively repeat the current cultural relations which sustain their recognition 
and place in society. However, when lives currently deemed culturally unrecognisable cite the 
conventions of rights they are placing current discourses of recognition into crisis (Zivi, 
2009:165). It is in this respect that rights claiming is performative, actively creating, reinforcing 
or - importantly - challenging the normative framework in which the claim is made. 
Thus, the performativity of rights claiming may intersect with what Butler outlines as the 
performativity of gender in order for hegemonic gender identities to be contested and 
reconfigured rather than reified (Zivi, 2005:379). Butler’s more recent corpus, influenced by her 
own personal involvement in the LGBT human rights movement, moves towards endorsing the 
performative potential of rights to engender new ways of recognising and conceiving identity. 
For example, LGBT human rights campaigns are advanced as potentially aiding the 
resignification of the range of lives which are recognisable and valued in society; ‘one of the 
central tasks of lesbian and gay international human rights is to assert in clear and public terms 
the reality of homosexuality, not as an inner truth, not as a sexual practice, but as one of the 
defining features of the social world in its very intelligibility’ (Butler, 2004a:29-30). When those 
who are unrecognised assert a right they are not struggling with rights attaching to persons, but 
are interacting with norms in order to be recognised as persons and the social and political 
processes by which recognisable life is articulated (Butler, 2004a:32). 
Therefore, rights claiming’s involvement in the citation of norms can open up subversive 
strategies for alternative localised gender performances of what is currently intelligible as 
“woman” and resultantly an opening of gendered livability. Asserting that women should be 
recognised as possessing access to reproductive choice in Northern Ireland through the public 
claiming of rights reveals what is currently understood as sex and gender to be unstable social 
productions which are open to different, foreclosed performances. Utilising rights claiming as 
part of a feminist strategy to counter restrictive abortion provision, therefore, carries the potential 
to publically challenge how women and their reproductive experiences are culturally recognised 
and the precarity involved in such recognition. This potential is coupled with the wider 
possibility of the troubling of gender and its performative maintenance as a social doing more 
generally which may challenge pre-existing and taken for granted ways of being, thinking and 




Analysis in this article has sought to consider two strategic approaches to pro-choice 
framing of abortion in Northern Ireland from the perspective of Judith Butler’s theoretical work 
on life and possibilities to reiterate the framing operating in each in order to work towards more 
radical approaches in feminist advocacy. Engagement with two recent framing developments in 
this location has illustrated the potential that current pro-choice strategising may contain for 
working towards a renewed approach to life in the abortion debate and in social life more 
generally. The attention to the vulnerability of intersubjective life facilitated through the health 
frame provides an opportunity to engage public debate on society’s egalitarian obligations to 
minimise precarity and maximise livability. Similarly, the public claiming of rights as part of the 
rights frame engages the question of gendered life and its apparent naturalness in a new and 
potentially subversive way. Feminist strategising must capitalise upon such moments in order to 
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encourage a rethinking of life as a process sustained by social and political conditions, and a shift 
beyond the binarised paralysis that the abortion debate has been caught in. 
However, it is important to note that the potential for the rethinking of life through such 
capitalisation must be viewed as just that; potential. The reiteration of any social concept or idea 
is always itself precarious, open to unpredictable and uncontrollable results. This lesson is 
evident from Butler’s work on performativity. For Butler, the performative contradiction offers 
no performative promises because any reiteration is inherently unstable, unpredictable and 
dependent upon contextual reception (see Lloyd, 2007b). While it is this unpredictability that 
opens up the possibility for novel and subversive repetitions to current ways of thinking and 
being, it is also what renders the effect of any subversive repetition inevitably unsure. Subversive 
reiterations can operate to aid the denaturalisation of normative significations and usages, but 
equally the iteration may be deemed socially unintelligible with potentially damaging results 
(Lloyd, 2007a:64; Butler, 2004a:3). 
Nevertheless, because lack of predictability is an immutable condition of any democratic 
action, subversive or non-subversive, the rethinking of life in abortion debate and reiteration of 
feminist strategising should not be discouraged. It is the incessant contestation for disruption 
which Butler sees as characteristic of any radical practice (Butler, 2004a:39). Feminist 
engagement in the radicalisation of the abortion debate should embrace the unpredictability of 
alternative, socially challenging approaches made possible through the reiteration of current pro-
choice frames rather than allowing the possibility of failure to breed political paralysis. Engaging 
in radical politics requires activists to see their activity not as serving to bring political debate to 
an end but as an opening (Zivi, 2012:27). It is this opening which the abortion debate requires in 
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